Darfur: A Brief History of the Crisis.

I would like to begin surveying the current humanitarian crisis in Darfur, Sudan. Eventually I will explore the possibilities of both aggressive and pacifistic interventions in Darfur. Today, however, I will offer a brief history of the crisis.

This post is an excerpt taken from the 2007 UN report on the Darfur crisis (released in March 2007). Full text is available at:

www.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/docs/4session/A-HRC-4-80.doc

A - Brief history and causes of the conflict

The causes of conflict in Darfur are complex. Historically, tribal groups have come into conflict over land, water or livestock, but such disputes were settled through traditional tribal mechanisms. But in the 1970s, in part in an effort to modernize, Khartoum introduced a number of administrative changes that began to erode those mechanisms. First Darfur was divided into three states, fragmenting the collective power of tribal groups. Khartoum then appointed new officials with both executive and judicial powers at the state level, and appointed leaders at the local level based upon loyalty to the central government, without regard to the traditional leadership recognized by the communities. While traditional mechanisms were still sought out, those structures were severely weakened, just as power relations between groups were being distorted.

In the 1970s and the 1980s, increased desertification and drought resulted in significant movements of people, with nomadic groups moving deeper into southern areas as well as “newcomers” entering from Chad, Libya Arab Jamahiriya and Mauritania. With Darfur’s own issues of scarce water and other resources, relations became increasingly contentious. The intensity of conflicts increased significantly with the formation of village defense groups and militias and the influx of small arms and light weapons into the region. By the end of the 1980s most conflict was between the Fur and nomadic tribes.

In addition to the struggles around land and resources, the peoples of Darfur have felt discriminated against and marginalized by the central Government. Generally excluded from social services normally provided by the State such as education and basic medical care, they have had no significant political voice in Khartoum. Attempts by the Government to mediate ongoing tribal conflicts produced no long-term results, fueling the perception that Khartoum was unwilling or unable to protect Darfurians or to address their broader needs. Quite to the contrary, as fighting intensified between 1995-1998, the Government began its recruitment of militias, further aggravating divisions.

Against this backdrop of conflict and marginalization, two rebel groups began to organize in 2001/02 – the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) – drawing their members primarily from village defense groups. Most rebels were from the Fur, Massalit and Zaghawa tribes. Interestingly, they were calling for equality and justice for all Sudanese and not just redress of more narrow tribal interests. The rebel forces began attacking Government police and military targets in late 2002, and those attacks accelerated in 2003.

B- Nature of the Government’s response

The Government was not prepared either for the intensity or the successes of the rebel attacks. With many of its forces engaged in its long war with the Sudan People Liberation Army (SPLA) in South Sudan, Khartoum was also concerned because many rank and file soldiers in the Sudanese military were from Darfur. The Government significantly picked up its recruitment of proxy militias, continuing to exploit the existing and ongoing tensions between tribal groups. Those members of Arab tribes recruited to fight in Government-backed counterinsurgency operations became known as “Janjaweed,” which is a term used in Darfur for an armed man on horse or camel.

Janjaweed attacks, sometimes in concert with Government land and air forces have been and continue to be primarily directed against the civilian population of Darfur, and focused especially on the tribal groups from which most of the rebels have been drawn. In both refugee camps, and in our discussions with a number of observers, we were told of such joint attacks on civilians. Women, children and men have been killed indiscriminately. Villages have been razed, livestock stolen or killed, and crops destroyed, and whole populations forcefully displaced, in part in an attempt to deprive rebel groups of support and resources. In particular, rape and sexual assault have been widespread and systematic, terrorizing women and breaking down families and communities.

III- The Darfur Peace Agreement, the ensuing violence and the responsibility to protect

Attempts to resolve the conflict began in 2003, and a ceasefire between the Government and the SLM/A was signed on 3 September of that year. A report to the AU Peace and Security Council read, “Following the September Ceasefire Agreement, fighting largely stopped between the Government and the SLM/A. However violence intensified against the civilian population. A militia group called ‘DJanjaweed’ deliberately targeted civilians viewed as providing support to the SLM/A and the JEM.”

As violence and violations of human rights continued, so did attempts to stop the conflict. On 8 April 2004, the Government, the SLM/A, and JEM signed a humanitarian ceasefire agreement and protocols on establishing humanitarian assistance in Darfur. The ceasefire agreement called for the establishment of a Ceasefire Commission (CFC) to monitor the cessation of hostilities, supported by an AU Observer Mission. Appeals were made to the United Nations and the international community to support the CFC, to “ensure the scrupulous compliance” of warring parties to the ceasefire.

Subsequent efforts for peace in Darfur took place in Addis Ababa and in Abuja mediated by the African Union and with all parties to the conflict participating. But against this backdrop, violence was again on the rise in Darfur as all parties sought military gains to advantage them in the talks. At the seventh round of negotiations, the Darfur Peace Agreement was signed on 5 May 2006, but only by the Government and by one faction of the SLM (that of Mini Minawi, SLM/MM). The SLA faction led by Abdul Wahid (SLM/AW) did not sign, nor did the JEM.

Since the signing of the DPA, the security situation in the region has deteriorated. Non-signatory rebel factions have splintered. Though hostilities have been significantly reduced between the two signatories to the DPA, fighting between signatories and those opposed to the DPA escalated in violation of the ceasefire agreements. Attempts by these factions to meet and develop common positions for renewed efforts to open the DPA to new negotiations have been attacked and bombed by Government forces. Violations of human rights and international humanitarian law have increased by all parties to the conflict since the signing of the DPA. Armed banditry and other criminal activity have also increased.

People began to flee the fighting that erupted in Sudan’s western region of Darfur in early 2003. By the end of 2004, some 200,000 Sudanese had fled across the border to neighboring Chad and an estimated 1.6 million were displaced within Darfur. The deteriorating security situation since the DPA has resulted in tens of thousands of newly displaced – now totaling well over two million displaced people in Darfur -- and 30,000 more refugees in the camps in Chad, with new arrivals daily.

Cross-border attacks into Chad by Janjaweed and retaliations by rebels and Chadian forces have resulted in a dramatic increase in Chadian IDPs – from about 30,000 in June of 2006 to over 113,000 by the end of that year. Today, the conflict is also having a growing impact in the Central African Republic. If the conflict in Darfur is not meaningfully and equitably resolved, bringing peace and security to its people, it could increasingly engulf the region. UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon has called for a peace-keeping force along both borders.

Humanitarian aid has, since the beginning of the conflict, consistently been restricted by the Government with delays in the issuing of visas, travel permits to go to Darfur, daily travel permits to leave the capitals in Darfur, and fuel permits to travel around Darfur. But with the spiraling of violence since the DPA, humanitarian access to populations in dire need has been increasingly strangled and in some areas it has ceased entirely. Action by rebel groups has also impacted humanitarian access in recent months.

Attacks on humanitarian agencies have increased dramatically over the past months. On 17 January 2007, in an unprecedented initiative, 14 UN agencies with operations in Darfur issued a Joint Statement on the urgency of the situation. They noted that: 12 aid workers have been killed in the past 6 months -- more than in the previous 2 years; 30 NGO and UN compounds were directly attacked by armed groups; and more than 400 aid workers were forced to relocate 31 times from different locations throughout the 3 Darfur states in both government and rebel controlled areas There have also been three sexual assaults on relief workers in the previous five months – the first in September 2006 by Janjaweed /militia, the second in December 2006 by SLA/MM forces, and the third on 19 January 2007 by Government police and National Security agents.

IV - Sudan’s actions regarding the Responsibility to Protect

The witnesses, victims and observers with whom we spoke, and the UN and other documentation consulted underscore that the killing of civilians in Darfur remains widespread. Violence has increased since late 2005 and has continued unabated into 2007. There were numerous large scale attacks on civilian communities during this period. Descriptions of these attacks indicate that tactics used have been very similar to those used during the height of the war in Darfur in late 2003 and 2004, characterized by (1) coordination of operations between the Sudanese armed forces and government-supported militia, (2) failure to respect the principles of distinction and proportionality, and (3) grave violations of international human rights and humanitarian law. While precise figures are not available, the UN estimates that 200,000 civilians have been killed as a direct result of the conflict or due to its devastating impact on access to health care, food and other life essentials.

Rape and sexual violence are widespread across Darfur, including cases of gang-rape. Since May 2006 sexual violence has also been reported in intra-tribal attacks. Despite the well-known patterns of rape of women around IDP camps, the authorities have done little to diminish the threat or investigate cases reported. Monitoring of the criminal justice system over the last two years has shown that very few cases of rape are investigated or prosecuted relative to the number of incidents that occur. Access to justice and prosecution of rape is further complicated both by cultural and by institutional factors, including the provisions of the criminal law combining rape and adultery in the same article. Women are also attacked in and around refugee camps in Chad.

Arbitrary arrest and detention in Darfur by government security forces continue. Individuals reportedly targeted include lawyers, community leaders and others who work on human rights, Sudanese who work for international organizations or who are perceived as cooperating too closely with the international community, individuals who share the predominant ethnicities of various rebel groups, and Sudanese who display opposition political views. Since May 2006 security forces have also targeted individuals who openly oppose the DPA. Sudanese who work closely with IDPs are also targeted, often on the basis of accusations that they encourage popular discontent and anti-government sentiment.

Since September 2006 there has been a wave of arrests of Darfurians in Khartoum. The arrests of over 30 Darfurian teachers, businessmen, journalists and university students predominately from the Fur, Masaalit and Zaghawa tribes have been carried out by the police and National Security, purportedly in furtherance of the investigation into the murder of Mohamed Taha, a prominent editor. Former detainees suggest that the murder investigation is being used as a pretext to arrest those with perceived links to rebel movements in Darfur. To date 13 detainees have been released due to lack of evidence, with three released as recently as 29 January 2007. Another three continue to be held without charge while 19 others have been charged with murder.

Arbitrary restrictions on freedom of expression, association and assembly are widespread. Human rights defenders, lawyers, local leaders and political opponents voicing concerns or expressing views that are critical, of the Government, continue to be particularly vulnerable to abuses by state security agencies. The UN has documented numerous cases of people being harassed, arrested, detained and physically abused for voicing their human rights concerns. The victims include members of NGOs, journalists, and people who file complaints with the police or other government officials.

The HLM has also received credible information of torture, inhumane and degrading treatment by National Security and Military Intelligence during attacks and in the treatment of detainees. The methods used include beatings with whips, sticks and gun butts, prolonged sun exposure, starvation, electrocution, and burning with hot candle wax or molten plastic. Many detainees are held incommunicado without charge or access to a lawyer.